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No one should underestimate the mini-miracle that has just occurred in South Africa. The African National Congress, a liberation party that has ruled unchallenged for 30 years, was humbled in a free and fair election last month. It accepted the result, eschewed a potential lurch into radical populism and set about forming a government of national unity in which its main partner will be the market-oriented Democratic Alliance.
任何人都不应低估刚刚在南非发生的小奇迹。非洲人国民大会(African National Congress，简称非国大)，一个统治了30年而没有受到挑战的解放党但在上月举行的一次自由公正的选举中败北。该党接受了选举结果，避免了可能陷入激进民粹主义的局面，并着手组建一个民族团结政府，其主要合作伙伴将是以市场为导向的民主联盟(Democratic Alliance)。
The prospect of a centrist government bolstered by the DA’s proven administrative skills has energised investors. The rand and the stock market have rallied since the prospect of a coalition government became real. Investors who have not looked at South Africa seriously for 15 years are re-evaluating its prospects.
在民主联盟久经考验的行政能力的支持下，一个中间派政府的前景鼓舞了投资者。自组建联合政府的前景成为现实以来，南非兰特和股市已经反弹。15年来没有认真看待南非的投资者正在重新评估其前景。
But if South Africa has taken the best of all possible post-election paths, no one should underestimate the magnitude of the challenge. The haggling over cabinet positions and more fundamental questions about how the coalition will run foreshadow the pitfalls ahead. It is still possible the DA could withdraw from the coalition altogether if it does not get the posts it believes it deserves.
但是，如果说南非已经走上了大选后可能的最佳道路，那么任何人都不应低估挑战的艰巨性。关于内阁职位的讨价还价以及关于联合政府如何运作的更基本问题都预示着未来的陷阱。如果民主联盟无法获得其认为应得的职位，那么它仍有可能完全退出联合政府。
Cyril Ramaphosa, the centrist president, probably sees working with the DA as a chance to neutralise the more radical wing of the ANC and to curb members who see politics as a means of enrichment. But it will not be easy to get the ANC and the DA to work together given their deep ideological divisions, with the DA keener on free enterprise and the ANC on state intervention.
中间派总统西里尔•拉马福萨可能认为，与民主联盟合作是一个机会，可以中和非国大中更激进的一派，并遏制那些将政治视为致富手段的成员。但是，考虑到非国大和民主联盟党在意识形态上的深刻分歧，让它们合作并不容易，民主联盟党更热衷于企业自由，而非国大则更热衷于国家干预。
Nor will it be easy to paper over internal divisions within the DA, whose leadership is split between those who see the coalition as a chance to exercise power and others who sense a trap. According to the latter view, the DA could lose its political identity by working with the ANC, which has nearly double the number of MPs. If the DA finds itself in a subservient role, sceptics argue, it could find itself either powerless to effect real change or scapegoated for everything that goes wrong.
要消除民主联盟内部的分歧也并非易事，该党领导层分为两派，一派认为联合是行使权力的机会，另一派则认为这是个陷阱。后一种观点认为，与拥有近两倍议员人数的非国大合作可能会让民主联盟失去自己的政治身份。怀疑论者认为，如果民主联盟发现自己处于从属地位，那么它可能会发现自己要么无力实现真正的变革，要么成为一切错误的替罪羊。
The immediate fight has been over cabinet posts. The DA wanted 12. It will get six if it is lucky. Now the struggle is over ministries. In the latest twist, Ramaphosa is seeking to unpick an agreement that would have seen the DA head the powerful trade and industry ministry. Some ANC cadres cannot stomach the idea of a market-focused party running a ministry that has championed industrial policy, albeit without obvious success.
眼下的斗争是围绕内阁职位展开的。民主联盟想要12个职位。如果幸运的话，它会得到6个。现在的斗争是围绕各部的。在最新的转折中，拉马福萨正在寻求取消一项协议，该协议将由民主联盟党领导强大的贸易和工业部。一些非国大干部无法接受一个以市场为中心的政党管理一个倡导产业政策的部门，尽管该政策没有取得明显的成功。
Beyond the immediate bartering lies a more fundamental question of whether the DA can run ministries as it wishes or will have to bow to ANC diktat. It has already withdrawn its objection to a minimum wage and to black empowerment legislation that it regards as prone to corruption and inefficiency. Other battles lie ahead, particularly over so-called cadre deployment (parachuting unqualified party hacks into jobs) and the ANC’s ties with unions that often block attempts to reform sectors such as education.
除了眼前的讨价还价之外，还有一个更根本的问题，即民主联盟是否可以按照自己的意愿管理各部委，还是不得不屈从于非国大的命令。它已经撤回了对最低工资和黑人赋权立法的反对意见，因为它认为这些立法容易导致腐败和低效。未来还会有其他斗争，尤其是所谓的干部调配（将不合格的党内杂务人员空降到工作岗位上），以及非国大与工会的关系，后者经常阻挠教育等部门的改革尝试。
There is a yet bigger obstacle ahead. That is the sheer difficulty of conjuring the rapid growth necessary to tackle the profound economic and social divisions that make South Africa the most unequal society in the world. If 30 years of state intervention have been unable adequately to address the legacy of apartheid, a system that deliberately engineered a Black underclass, it is far from clear that a few market reforms will do the trick either.
还有一个更大的障碍摆在面前。南非是世界上最不平等的社会，要想实现必要的快速增长以解决深层次的经济和社会分化问题，难度可想而知。如果说30年的国家干预无法充分解决种族隔离制度的遗留问题（这是一种蓄意制造黑人下层阶级的制度），那么一些市场改革也很难奏效。
In five years’ time, the danger is that, even if the coalition holds steady, not enough progress will have been made to convince a skittish electorate. If that is the case, voters may turn to parties offering more populist, but ultimately more dangerous, solutions.
未来5年危险在于，即使联合政府保持稳定，也不会取得足够的进展来说服易变的选民。如果是这样的话，选民们可能会转向提供更为民粹主义、但最终更危险的解决方案的政党。